1.1 BACKGROUND TO THE STUDY
The history of the evolution of human societies is replete with various conflicts, crises and wars that threatened the survival of human beings and various measures adopted to resolve them. Being an integral characteristic of human nature, violence has often been used to seek redress to perceived grievances or in the pursuit of some personal or group interest and security. Human beings have inbuilt redress mechanisms that are most often used with prejudice and hatred, resulting in the destruction of lives and property. Security concern is largely believed to be the major factor that forced human beings to abandon the individualistic primitive state of nature to form organized societies.
The security of societies in the contemporary world is phenomenal and complex. This is because the world is becoming increasingly interdependent and interconnected as information and communication technology (ICT) have rendered nations borderless making movements between cities much easier. 1
In this emerging world order, new and asymmetric threats such as violent extremism, domestic terrorism and intra state conflicts have threatened to redefine the international system. 2 3
There is always a compelling obligation on the state to use constitutional provisions to maintain law and order. In order to achieve this, most nations depend on the Police that have the primary responsibility for the maintenance of law and order depending on the complexity, diversity and the range of actors involved in such conflict. In instances where the scale of the violence overwhelms the capacity of the police to contain, as has been witnessed in different parts of the world, the military is usually called upon to restore normalcy and bring the situation under control. Such military role is what is referred to as internal security. In such circumstances and depending on the nature and peculiar requirements of the situation, the military in conjunction with other national security apparatuses form a Joint Task Force (JTF) to manage the crisis. This was the justification for the British military’s involvement in Northern Ireland in 1969. 4
Joint Task Force has become increasingly integrated into national internal security conflict resolution mechanism. In the JTF arrangement to confront an emerging crisis, each Service brings to the joint force, different skills, competencies and amalgamation of assets resulting in a synergy that is beyond the sum of the individual service capability. 5 6
In the United States of America (USA), Chapter l8 of Title 10 Section 332 of the United States Code entitled “Military Support for Civilian Law Enforcement Agencies”. 7 8
In Indonesia, the 1945 Constitution established the Indonesian National Armed Forces, Tentara National Indonesia (TNI) and gave it, as part of its responsibilities, the legal authority to suppress insurrection whenever called upon to do so by the President. Consequently, this enabled the Indonesian Government, between 1998 and 2002 to deploy the Army Strategic Reserve Command (KOSTRAD) and the Mobile Brigade (BRIMOB) in a JTF to contain the violent ethno-religious conflict in the Maluku Archipelago. 9 10
In Ghana, the Constitution of the Republic of Ghana, Chapter 17 established the Armed Forces of Ghana (AFG). The statute establishing the AFG allows the military to intervene in domestic disturbances to maintain Ghana’s Internal Security.
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This was the basis that the Ghanian Central Government used to deploy a JTF to quell the conflict between the Konkombas and the Nanumbas in Northern Ghana in 1994 in what is today termed the Guinea Fowl War. During the conflict, there were about 2,000 deaths in 1994 alone, 322 villages were devastated and some 178,000 people were displaced.12
However, the intervention of the JTF effectively contained the situation and succeeded in stopping the protracted conflict between the 2 tribes.In Nigeria, the Armed Forces of Nigeria (AFN) has a constitutional responsibility to provide Military Aid to Civil Power (MACP) and Military Aid to Civil Authorities (MACA) in time of crisis. The 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria in Section 217 Subsections 1 and 2, captures this need by establishing the AFN. In Subsection 2(c) the Constitution specifically bestows on the AFN the responsibility of suppressing insurrection and acting in aid of civil authorities personified by the Nigeria Police to restore law and order when called upon to do so by the President, but subject to such conditions as may be prescribed by an Act of the National Assembly. 13
The spate of grave security breaches and incessant bomb explosions carried out by the Boko Haram Terrorists (BHTs) in some parts of Northern Nigeria threatened the security and internal stability of the nation. Consequently, a JTF comprising the military and other security forces was formed and nicknamed Operation RESTORE ORDER I (JTF ORO1). The JTF ORO1 was mandated to contain the intransigent behaviour of the BHTs in the North Eastern Nigeria. The employment of The JTF OROI by the FGNsignificantly reduced tension, rekindled hope and minimised human sufferings in Borno State between its induction in June 2011 and August 2013 when it was de-inducted.
However, despite these modest achievements, the effects of the use of JTF in mitigating IS problems in the country is not fully realised by the general populace. This is occasioned by previous military operations like the Zaki Biam and Odi massacres which were considered an abuse of the right to life and a display of impunity by the military. Additionally, the general public is curious and seemingly critical of the JTF, arguing in some casesthat despite the resources and manpower committed in JTF OROI, there seem to be no corresponding significant achievementas the activities of the BHTs have continued unabated.
The purpose of this study is therefore, to evaluate JTF ORO1 in IS in Nigeria. Accordingly, the researcher’s motivation is to contribute towards finding effective ways of utilising JTF in mitigating IS problems in Nigeria.
1.2 STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM
Nigeria has witnessed an upsurge in internal security threats since 1999 and terror related attacks have acquired an alarming dimension in recent times. The internal crises have led to IS leading to the establishment of various JTFs. One of such JTFs is the JTF ORO1 constituted in 2011 to combat the BHTs’ activities in Borno State and indeed most states in North Eastern Nigeria. Following increasing BHTs’ violent attacks on mostly civilian population, President Goodluck Jonathan on 14 May 2013, declared a state of emergencyin the states of Adamawa, Borno and Yobe inorder to checkmate the activities of the insurgents.
The JTF ORO1, in carrying out the IS tasks in Borno State had some operational challenges.The challenges appeared to relate largely to a lack of integrated intelligence gathering capability, inadequate training and experience of personnel in counter terrorism operations. Also, logistic support to the JTF and its ability to conduct media operations were considered less than adequate. Though several efforts were made to solve these problems, their effects were apparent. It is against this background that this study seeks answers to the following questions:
1.3 OBJECTIVES OF THE STUDY
The main objective of this study is to asses JTF in IS in order to establish its effectiveness in the resolution of IS problems in Nigeria. The specific objectives of the study are as follows:
1.4 SIGNIFICANCE OF THE STUDY
The significance of the study is in the utility of its outcome and recommendations by policy makers at the Presidency, National Assembly (NASS) National Security Council (NSC), MOD, DHQ and the Services to assist in policy formulation and decision making to curb the menace of domestic terrorism. It will also be valuable to the Office of the National Security Adviser (ONSA) particularly the Counter-Terrorism Department (CTD) in coordinating the efforts of security forces in the fight against domestic terrorism.
Additionally, The DSS, NPF and the National Security and Civil Defence Corps (NSCDC) will also benefit from the study in their complementary roles in the fight against domestic terrorism. Scholars and researchers in the field of counter terrorism will find the study useful as it will contribute to the existing body of knowledge on the contributions of JTF in IS particularly domestic counter terrorism/counter insurgency.
1.5 SCOPE OF THE STUDY
The study was delineated by time, space and content boundaries. In terms of time, the study covers the period between 2003 and August 2013.This period was chosen because it is within which Nigeria witnessed a new twist in the scale, frequency, pattern, sophistication and dimension of terrorism. It was also the time JTF OROI was inducted and de-inducted in Borno State for 7 Division Nigerian Army to take over the operation. However, reference to some earlier dates was made for the purpose of comprehension and data analysis.
In terms of space, the research focussed on JTF ORO1 in Maiduguri. This location was chosen because the main activity of JTF ORO1 was in Maiduguri and environs while other NA organised Operations RESTORE ORDER 11 and 111not JTF were being conducted in the same region during the same period. In terms of content, the study was limited to the evaluation of JTF ORO1 within the context of IS in Nigeria.
1.6 METHODOLOGY
The work adopted a combination of content analysis and field survey method. This involved the gathering of official documents and publications as well as unstructured interviews. The assessment of JTF ORO 1 was based purely on interviews of past commanders of the operation and relevant security stakeholders. However, the methodology for this study covered 6 distinct areas which include type of research, sources of data and method of data collection. Others are sampling techniques, method of data analysis and method of data presentation. These are discussed subsequently.
1.6.1 Type of Research: The research was essentially a descriptive research as it builds on exploratory works done by other researchers. This work entails the following:
1.6.2 Sources of Data: The Data for this study were obtained from primary and secondary sources. These are amplified as follows:
1.6.3 Methods of Data Collection: Primary data were collected using unstructured and structured interviews, discussions and consultations with relevant stakeholders in the defence industry and related fields. Official documents and other publications were also examined to derive secondary data.
1.6.4 Sampling Technique: The population considered comprised security personnel that took part in JTF ORO1 and the sample size was 100 respondents. The purposive sampling technique was used to select the sample of the population from which data were collected for the study. This involves unstructured interviews on the subject with selected AFN personnel and other stakeholders. It was assumed that only those who have commanded or taken part in JTF operations would be knowledgeable as to understand and provide relevant data for the study. The samples of the questions used for unstructured interviews are at Appendix 2.
1.6.5 Method of Data Analysis: Qualitative method of data analysis was employed. The data from the unstructured interviews and secondary sources were analysed qualitatively. The analysis was followed by logical reasoning to arrive at deductions which were the basis for the recommendations towards improving IS in the fight against domestic terrorism using JTF in Nigeria.
1.6.6 Method of Data Presentation: The data generated in this study were presented in descriptive and analytical forms with the aid of tables, diagrams, pie and bar charts where appropriate. Others were reduced to appendices for clarity.
1.7 LIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY
The limitation encountered in the course of this study was lack of sufficient literature on the subject and poor record keeping at DHQ and Services Headquarters. Also, restricted access to classified documents presented a major challenge due to the sensitive nature of the subject. Efforts were made to overcome this limitation through discussions, consultations and interviews of those involved in planning and direction of AFN operations to fill the gap.
In particular, all the past senior commanders of JTF ORO1 were interviewed. Furthermore, the data obtained from primary and secondary sources were analysed to fill the gap in the absence of official records. The quality and validity of the study was thus unaffected. The next chapter discussed the literature review.